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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of limited commitment on sorting when two sides of a
frictionless market form pairs to share risk. On each side, agents are identical except
for their risk preferences. First, we provide analytical results when transfers do not
condition on the history of shocks. More risk-averse agents can commit to larger trans-
fers, as long as their consumption is less risky than their endowment. With sufficiently
large idiosyncratic risk and sufficient discounting of the future, matching is positive
assortative, unlike under full commitment. Second, we find positive-assortative stable
matchings when transfers are history dependent using a numerical algorithm.
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1 Introduction
Consider a two-sided, frictionless matching market whose members, ‘men’ and ‘women,’ are
risk averse, and who may form ‘couples’ to share an exogenous risk. Agents are heterogeneous
in their risk attitudes, but each man and woman faces the same gender-specific, non-tradable
risk. In short, consider a marriage problem with imperfectly transferable utility and without
search frictions. Legros and Newman (2007) and Chiappori and Reny (2016) show that all
stable matchings are negative assortative in risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense if couples
are assumed to share risk efficiently. That is, for any two couples, the more risk-averse man is
matched with the less risk-averse woman. Efficient risk sharing generates the greatest surplus
in diverse couples. The more risk-averse man is willing to decrease his consumption share
more in return for insurance. This makes him an attractive partner for the less risk-averse
woman, who has a comparative advantage in providing insurance.
The novelty in this paper is to acknowledge possible commitment problems. Our goal
is to study whether the negative-assortative-matching prediction in the literature (Legros
and Newman, 2007; Chiappori and Reny, 2016) is robust to limited commitment. To do
so, we build on the literature on risk sharing with self-enforcing transfers (Thomas and
Worrall, 1988; Kocherlakota, 1996). In addition to ex-ante participation constraints, where
each ‘spouse’ requires at least the utility he or she would get when ‘single,’ the contract must
satisfy ex-post participation constraints. That is, for any history of endowment realisations,
the sharing rule must be sustainable by voluntary transfers.
In our model matching takes place at time 0, and risk sharing takes place from time 1
onwards.1 First, we consider self-enforcing sharing rules with static contracts, which do
not condition on past realisations of shocks, as in Coate and Ravallion (1993). This is a
natural generalisation of atemporal models which admits analytical solutions. In addition,
we follow Legros and Newman (2007) in studying the case of a binary state space for analytical
tractability.
In contrast to full commitment, we find that sorting depends on the correlation of endow-
ments, or, more precisely, on the relative magnitude of idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. We
show that (i) if endowments covary negatively, then all stable matchings are positive assor-
tative for low enough discount factors, that is, when the commitment problem is sufficiently
severe. The threshold discount factor depends on the relative magnitude of idiosyncratic risk
and aggregate risk. On the other hand, (ii) if the correlation of endowments is non-negative,
1Recent literature on dynamic matching, such as Anderson and Smith (2010), considers (re)matching at
any time. Our qualitative results are robust to rematching if finding a new partner takes time, as discussed
at the end of Section 3.1.
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then matching is always negative assortative.
The intuition behind these results is the following. A key determinant of sorting is whether
risk aversion helps commitment on both sides of the market. This in turn depends on whether
consumption after risk-sharing transfers is less risky than the endowment for both spouses.
Risk aversion helps an agent to commit to transfers which reduce his/her own consumption
risk relative to autarky, while it makes taking on additional risk less credible. The two sides
can mutually reduce their consumption risk through transfers only when endowments are
negatively correlated. In this case, more risk-averse men and women can credibly commit
to larger transfers and hence achieve more insurance. If the discount factor is sufficiently
low, this effect dominates the effect of more efficient sharing of uninsurable risk among more
diverse agents, hence stable matchings are positive assortative. Instead when endowments
are positively correlated, an agent’s consumption risk can only be reduced at the expense of
increasing the partner’s risk. In this case, risk aversion makes the commitment problem less
severe on one side of the market and more severe on the other. Hence couples with more
diverse risk preferences achieve more insurance, and matching is negative assortative.
Finally, we study whether our results are robust to history-dependent contracts (see
Kocherlakota, 1996, and others). While the long-run allocations can be characterised an-
alytically, sorting also depends on the couple’s ability to sustain transfers during an initial
transition period. We turn to numerical methods and propose an algorithm to identify sta-
ble matchings and determine their assortativity. We confirm that stable matchings can be
positive assortative allowing for history-dependent sharing rules as well.
Two-sided, one-to-one matching with imperfectly transferable utility is relevant in a wide
range of applications, including household formation, principal-agent models, e.g. matching
projects to managers (see Legros and Newman, 2007), matching workers to firms or into teams
(pairs with complementary skills), joint ventures, and sharecropping agreements. Further,
limited commitment is a relevant friction in all these applications, because interaction is
likely to occur repeatedly once a match is formed, and quitting is an option. We discuss two
applications in more detail, household formation and matching workers to firms.
The risk-sharing motive for household formation has been highlighted in several papers,
including Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), Ogaki and Zhang (2001),
and Hess (2004). Recent literature investigates whether the risk-sharing motive might help
to explain the composition of households, see Schulhofer-Wohl (2006), Legros and New-
man (2007), and Chiappori and Reny (2016). Compared to negative-assortative matching,
positive-assortative matching reduces heterogeneity within couples and increases heterogene-
ity across couples. The answer to the question whether risk preferences within the households
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are similar is key to link individual preferences with decisions at the household level, such as
consumption-saving (Mazzocco, 2004) and portfolio allocation. Moreover, much of the em-
pirical literature builds on the assumption of identical preferences within the household (see
Chiappori and Reny, 2016, for a discussion). If matching were indeed negative assortative,
then such an assumption would be problematic. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests
that limited commitment is relevant within households. Using the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX), Mazzocco (2007) finds inter-temporal decisions within US households to be
subject to limited commitment. Similarly, Dercon and Krishnan (2000) provide evidence
against efficient risk sharing within households in rural Ethiopia.
Alternatively, consider firms matching with workers. Both sides are risk averse and het-
erogeneous in their risk aversion.2 For a matched firm-worker pair, the wage is determined
according to a long-term wage contract as in Thomas and Worrall (1988).3 In this paper we
ask whether more risk-averse workers sort into jobs where the employer is more risk averse.
Risk-sharing considerations in wage determination have been highlighted by Guiso, Pista-
ferri, and Schivardi (2005), who find that shocks to a firm’s output can account for about
15 percent of the overall variability of workers’ earnings. Further, building on Thomas and
Worrall (1988), recent literature suggests that limited commitment may explain the observed
wage rigidity in long-term contracts on the US labour market, see Rudanko (2009).
In this paper we follow Legros and Newman (2007) and Chiappori and Reny (2016) in
restricting our attention to economies where matching is fully determined by risk sharing.
Recent literature shows that matching under full commitment may no longer be negative
assortative in risk aversion if spouses jointly decide on the riskiness of their income as well.4
Indeed, homogeneous spouses may find it easier to agree on their joint exposure to risk. On
the other hand, the efficient sharing of any such risk still favours spouses who are hetero-
geneous, and sorting depends on which of the two forces dominates. Our results suggest
that even if risk sharing determines sorting, matching may still be positive assortative if
2A large literature, starting with the seminal work of Sandmo (1971), analyses the behaviour of risk-averse
firms.
3Note that we deviate from Thomas and Worrall (1988) in assuming that the firm is risk averse.
4Wang (2015) considers couples who select a joint project according to risk and return. He finds that
matching is positive assortative if the risk in higher return projects increases at a growing rate, as measured
by an increasing coefficient of variation. In this case, agents find it optimal to match along their preferences
over projects. Conversely, if the coefficient of variation is decreasing in expected return, the gains from
efficient risk sharing dominate, and matching is negative assortative. In Li, Sun, and Chen (2013), the two
sides may reduce household risk by exerting joint effort. Matching is positive assortative in settings of either
high risk aversion, or when effort has a sufficiently large effect on income risk. Serfes (2005) considers both
endogenous income and moral hazard. Risk-neutral principals who differ in the riskiness of their projects
are matched with agents who differ in risk attitudes and whose effort is unobservable. He finds that the
equilibrium relationship between risk and incentives can be both positive and negative.
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commitment plays a role.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the economic environment,
and characterises equilibria under the benchmark assumption of full commitment. Section 3
contains the main results of the paper, providing sufficient condition for assortativity of stable
matchings without commitment. We first consider static risk-sharing contracts (Section 3.1),
then extend our analysis to dynamic contracts (Section 3.2). Section 4 concludes. Appendices
contain the proofs (Appendix A), results on the pattern of binding participation constraints
(Appendix B), and our algorithm to find stable matchings and determine their assortativity
with dynamic contracts (Appendix C).
2 The environment
Consider an endowment economy with 2N infinitely lived agents, each belonging to one of
two disjoint sub-populations, I and J of equal cardinality. From here onwards, we refer to
members i ∈ I and j ∈ J as ‘women’ and ‘men’, respectively. However, our framework
accommodates a host of interpretations other than potential spouses, including firms and
workers who may enter a long-term relationship.
Agents on each side of the matching market are exposed to an exogenous income risk at
each date t = 1, 2, ..., which is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time.
The income process is gender-specific, but not specific to any individual. Let st ∈ {s, s}
denote the state of the world at time t that governs both joint and individual levels of
endowment in terms of the perishable consumption good. For analytical tractability, we
consider a binary state space, as in Legros and Newman (2007). Both this and the i.i.d.
assumption can be relaxed in our numerical analysis. In particular, we can accommodate
any Markovian endowment process with finite state space.
The vector W = (w,w) denotes women’s state-contingent income, w and w in states s
and s, respectively. Similarly, we denote men’s income by M = (m,m). The state proba-
bilities Pr(st = s) = pi and Pr(st = s) = 1 − pi, as well as the income vectors are common
knowledge. If Ms i and Mr j decide to form a couple, their aggregate endowment is therefore
Z = W +M = (z, z). Without loss of generality, we assume z ≥ z.
The instantaneous utility function of Ms i is denoted u(i, c), where c denotes consump-
tion.5 We assume that u is twice differentiable in consumption and that it exhibits strict
5u(i, ·) can be interpreted as an indirect utility function which captures the attitude toward the residual
uninsurable risk in the presence of otherwise competitive financial markets. If the tradable risk is statistically
independent from the uninsurable risk, then u(i, ·) inherits monotonicity and risk aversion from utility over
total wealth (see Gollier, 2001).
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monotonicity and strict risk aversion, i.e., uc ≡ ∂u/∂c > 0 and ucc ≡ ∂2u/∂c2 < 0 everywhere.
We assume further that u satisfies the Inada conditions with respect to c for all agents,
i.e., limc→0 uc(i, c) = +∞, and limc→+∞ uc(i, c) = 0. Finally, we denote expected per-period
utility from a state-contingent consumption vector C = (c, c) by
Eu(i, C) = (1− pi)u (i, c) + piu (i, c) .
Alternatively, in our second application, substituting workers for women and firms for
men, we call W the exogenous and stochastic market wage (one unit of labour is the only
production input) and Z the firm’s revenue. If the firm hires a unit of labour on the spot
market, then its profit is M = Z −W . Firms and workers can instead match in order to
agree on a long-term state-contingent wage contract C.
Individuals are heterogenous with respect to their risk preferences. We assume throughout
this paper that Ms i′′ is strictly more risk averse than Ms i′ in the Arrow-Pratt sense.
That is, there exists a strictly increasing and strictly concave function φ which satisfies
u(i′′, ·) = φ(u(i′, ·)). Analogously, we assume that Mr j′′ is strictly more risk averse than
Mr j′.
The timing of agents’ interaction is as follows. At date t = 0, the two sides of the market
meet to form couples. At any subsequent date t = 1, 2, ..., nature first draws the publicly
observable state, then matched agents may decide to transfer some of their current income
to their partner, and finally consumption takes place.
Our definitions of stability and assortative matching are standard. Define the assignment
functions µ : I → {0} ∪ J and ψ : J → {0} ∪ I as follows: if Ms i (Mr j) is single, then
µ(i) = 0 (ψ(j) = 0) and we write 〈i〉 (〈j〉). Any matched couple, denoted 〈i, j〉, satisfies
µ(i) = j and ψ(j) = i. Finally, let %i (i) be Ms i’s weak (strict) ranking over potential
partners {0}∪J , that is, j %i j˜ (j i j˜) means that Ms i weakly (strictly) prefers Mr j over
Mr j˜. Similarly, let %j (j) be the analogous ranking over {0} ∪ I for Mr j.
Definition 1 (Stable matching). A couple 〈i, j〉 is individually rational if j %i 0 and
i %j 0, i.e., no agent strictly prefers to be single. A couple 〈i, j〉 is a blocking pair if j i µ(i)
and i j ψ(j). A matching is stable, if all couples are individually rational and if no blocking
pair exists.
Definition 2 (Assortative matching). Consider any two couples j = µ(i) and j˜ = µ(˜i).
A matching is positive assortative (PA) if j > j˜ ⇒ i > i˜. A matching is negative assortative
(NA) if j > j˜ ⇒ i < i˜. A matching is payoff equivalent to an alternative matching if
it preserves every agent’s expected discounted life-time utility. We say that the economy
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satisfies PAM (NAM) if every stable matching is payoff equivalent to a positive (negative)
assortative matching.
Notice that PAM and NAM are not mutually exclusive. There may exist a payoff-equivalent
PA matching to every NA matching, and vice versa.
Below, we make frequent use of two properties which help us organise and compare
alternative consumption rules. First, call C+ ≡ {(c, c) : c ≥ c} the set of state-contingent
payoffs which prescribe (weakly) higher consumption when joint income is high. Similarly,
define C− ≡ {(c, c) : c ≤ c}. Second, we use the following single-crossing criterion due to
Jewitt (1986) to identify when two agents with diverse risk preferences may disagree on the
ranking of risky prospects.
Definition 3 (Jewitt’s order). A random variable A ∼ FA dominates B ∼ FB according
to Jewitt’s order, A %SC B, if there exists a value x0 such that for all x,
(x− x0) (FA(x)− FB(x)) ≥ 0.
In this case we also say that A is less Jewitt-risky than B.
Consider Ms i′′ and Ms i′, and recall that Ms i′′ is more risk averse than Ms i′. Jewitt (1986)
shows that the relation A %SC B characterises the following behavioural property: if Ms i′
prefers a random variable A over B, then so does Ms i′′, i.e., A %i′ B ⇒ A %i′′ B. Conversely,
if Ms i′′ prefers B over A, then so does Ms i′.
With a binary state space, if FA crosses FB from below, then A must be a reduced spread
of B, i.e., b ≥ a ≥ a ≥ b. Note that if A and B belong to C+ (or if both belong to C−), then
FA and FB cannot cross more than once. If they do not cross at all, then A and B can be
ranked by first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD).
Finally, we draw on sufficient conditions for assortative matching due to Legros and
Newman (2007). Let Cij(v) denote the state-contingent consumption vector of Ms i when
sharing risk with Mr j, given a feasible utility promise v to Mr j. The economy satisfies
NAM if
Ci′′j′′(v
′′) %i′′ Ci′′j′(v′) ⇒ Ci′j′′(v′′) %i′ Ci′j′(v′), (GDD)
where C %i D if and only if the expected lifetime utility of Ms i is greater under contract C
than under D. Condition GDD is a generalised decreasing difference condition: given utility
promises v′ and v′′, if the more risk-averse woman Ms i′′ prefers to match with the more
risk-averse man Mr j′′, so does the less risk-averse woman. For GDD to hold, less risk-averse
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women should have their comparative advantage in sharing risk with more risk-averse men.
Similarly, the following generalised increasing difference (GID) condition guarantees PAM:
Ci′j′′(v
′′) %i′ Ci′j′(v′) ⇒ Ci′′j′′(v′′) %i′′ Ci′′j′(v′). (GID)
In order to distinguish the effects of repeated interaction from those of limited com-
mitment, we review the full commitment benchmark by considering the infinitely repeated
extension of the one-shot game in the literature.
2.1 Sorting under full commitment
To fix ideas, consider first a matched couple’s ex-ante problem for a single period. If Ms i
promises expected utility v to her partner Mr j, then the corresponding optimal sharing rule,
denoted C∗ij(v) =
(
c∗ij(v), c
∗
ij(v)
)
, must satisfy
C∗ij(v) ≡ argmax
C
Eu(i, C) s.t. Eu(j, Z − C) ≥ v. (1)
Varying v, the solutions C∗ij(v) describe the set of efficient sharing rules. Let x(i, C) denote
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the two states for agent i, i.e.,
x(i, C) ≡ uc(i, c)
uc(i, c)
.
Thanks to our regularity assumptions on the utility functions, it is optimal to equate marginal
rates of substitution. That is, we have x
(
i, C∗ij(v)
)
= x
(
j, Z − C∗ij(v)
)
(Borch, 1962).
Consider now the case where risk sharing takes place over infinitely many periods. Given
that preferences are separable over time with a common discount factor, we recover the
classic result that ratios of marginal utility remain constant across time and states. The
efficient many-period sharing rule prescribes the one-period arrangement C∗ij(v) from (1)
in each period t, where v is the per-period expected utility associated to a lifetime-utility
promise v/(1− β).
Taking into account the woman’s expected lifetime utility if she promises v to Mr j, we ap-
ply the sufficient condition for NAM in Legros and Newman (2007). Accordingly, our economy
satisfies NAM if, for any feasible utility levels v′ = Eu(j′, Z − C) and v′′ = Eu(j′′, Z − C),
GDD holds. We use Jewitt’s order to provide an alternative proof for the NAM result in the
literature (Legros and Newman, 2007; Chiappori and Reny, 2016), which may be of indepen-
dent interest for assortative matching among risk-averse agents. In contrast to the previous
literature, we allow for the case where joint income does not depend on the state, i.e., z = z.
Proposition 1. Under full commitment, the economy satisfies NAM.
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Proof. In Appendix A.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Efficient risk sharing must eliminate all
idiosyncratic risk in every couple. As a result, consumption after transfers is an increasing
function of joint income. The spouses’ risk attitudes only affect the allocation of aggregate
(not mutually insurable) risk. Whenever a woman accepts additional aggregate risk, the effect
on the partner’s expected utility will be greater if he is more risk averse. Similarly, if a woman
is less risk averse, then she has a comparative advantage in bearing additional aggregate risk.
Given that idiosyncratic risk does not matter in equilibrium, the ranking of partners on each
side is fully determined by the couple’s ability to generate surplus from sharing aggregate risk.
Therefore, since diversity in risk preferences increases the joint surplus, we obtain GDD. Note
that the special case where joint income is constant (z = z) guarantees constant consumption
in all couples. As a result, any two women rank any two men identically according to the
promised level of constant consumption. Hence both GDD and GID hold in this case, and
we have both NAM and PAM.
3 Sorting under limited commitment
We now ask whether commitment problems have a systematic effect on the sorting properties
of stable matchings with respect to risk aversion, i.e., we relax the assumption of full com-
mitment in Legros and Newman (2007) and Chiappori and Reny (2016). We assume that
insurance transfers must be self-enforcing in the sense of Thomas and Worrall (1988) and
Kocherlakota (1996). That is, the expected lifetime utility of each spouse must be at least
the autarky level at each time and state. Following these seminal papers, we assume that
agents apply a trigger strategy to enforce their partner’s promises: defectors can be excluded
from any future risk-sharing arrangements, and they consume their autarky endowment pro-
cess. This is the most severe subgame-perfect punishment for defection in this environment
(Kocherlakota, 1996). That is, agents have access to an optimal penal code in the sense of
Abreu (1988) to help them sustain cooperation. However, as we discuss in more detail below,
our results extend to various alternative specifications of the outside option, both exogenous
and endogenous.
Lack of commitment restricts the set of credible utility promises in period 0. In particular,
couples may be unable to sustain efficient risk sharing, and the solution for each couple
depends not only on the risk preferences of both spouses and the utility promise v to the
man, but also the discount factor β.
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In addition, as we show below, sorting under limited commitment depends on the correla-
tion of incomes on the two sides of the market, or, more precisely, on the relative importance
of idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. In order to take this into account, we parameterise the
income processes as follows. We assume, without loss of generality, that men’s endowment
satisfies M = (m,m) = (1 + y, 1 − y), where y ∈ (0, 1).6 Further, we assume that women’s
endowment takes the values W = (w,w) = (1 + εy, 1 − εy), where ε ∈ [−1, 1].7 If ε = −1,
the couple faces a risk-free joint income and only idiosyncratic risk. On the other hand, with
ε = 1 there is only aggregate risk, and any gains from sharing risk must be due to hetero-
geneous risk attitudes. In this case the coefficient of variation of the aggregate endowment
is y. With ε = 0, women face no income risk, and incomes are uncorrelated. As ε increases
from −1 to 1, the coefficient of variation of aggregate income increases from 0 to y, while id-
iosyncratic (or, zero-sum) risk decreases. Hence, we can say that the magnitude of aggregate
risk relative to idiosyncratic risk increases with ε.8
In our second application, to conform with our assumption of limited commitment, we
assume that both workers and firms may unilaterally terminate the long-term wage contract
at any time having observed the current market wage, and find (an) alternative work(er)
at that wage rate in the same period, as in Thomas and Worrall (1988). The correlation
between M and W captures if and how the firm’s revenue Z correlates with the stochastic
market wage rate.
Before analysing history-dependent contracts in Section 3.2, we first consider the effect
of commitment on sorting when sharing rules do not condition on past shocks, as in Coate
and Ravallion (1993). This allows us to determine analytically how risk aversion affects both
the commitment problem and the sharing rule, and in turn to provide sufficient conditions
for assortative matching.
3.1 Static contracts
Call Cij (v; β, ε) =
(
cij (v; β, ε) , cij (v; β, ε)
)
the static sharing rule which maximises the utility
of Ms i subject to the participation constraints and the expected per-period utility promise
6Note that our formulation can accommodate different mean incomes on the two sides of the market by
a normalisation of the utility functions.
7The cases where women’s risk is higher can be nested by appropriate relabelling.
8We introduce this parameter, because, with binary risk, the correlation coefficient of spouses’ incomes
can take three values only: −1, 0, and 1. The continuous ε allows to distinguish further subcases which result
in different matching predictions.
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v to Mr j, given β and ε. Formally, we have
Cij (v; β, ε) ≡ argmax
C
Eu(i, C)
s. t. Eu(j, Z − C) ≥ v, (2)
u (i, c) +
β
1− βEu(i, C) ≥ u(i, 1 + εy) +
β
1− βEu(i,W ), (3)
u (i, c) +
β
1− βEu(i, C) ≥ u(i, 1− εy) +
β
1− βEu(i,W ), (4)
u (j, z − c) + β
1− βEu(j, Z − C) ≥ u(j, 1 + y) +
β
1− βEu(j,M), (5)
u (j, z − c) + β
1− βEu(j, Z − C) ≥ u(j, 1− y) +
β
1− βEu(j,M). (6)
The first constraint, (2), is the promise-keeping constraint (PKC). The remaining four con-
straints are the participation/enforcement constraints (PCs). These require that the con-
tract be sustained voluntarily. That is, honouring the contract must be preferred to autarky,
whatever the realised state. The right-hand sides capture the present value of autarky in the
respective states. We say that a sharing rule is feasible if it satisfies all PCs (3)-(6).
Recall that negative sorting under full commitment (see Proposition 1) is driven by the
comparative advantage of heterogeneous couples when sharing aggregate risk. Without con-
straints on transfers, diversity generates a higher surplus. In the following, we determine the
qualities of an ‘attractive partner’ when transfers are constrained by limited commitment.
First, recall that an optimal sharing rule in which the PCs are slack must equate the
between-state MRS of the two spouses. If the PCs are binding, however, agents may only
be able to partially reduce the difference in MRS compared to autarky. We can therefore
distinguish two cases:
1. x (i,W ) ≥ x (i, Cij (v; β, ε)) ≥ x (j, Z − Cij (v; β, ε)) ≥ x (j,M),
2. x (i,W ) ≤ x (i, Cij (v; β, ε)) ≤ x (j, Z − Cij (v; β, ε)) ≤ x (j,M).
In the first case, the man makes a positive net transfer in state s, and the relevant PCs are
(4) and (5). In the second case, he does so in state s, and the relevant PCs are (3) and
(6).9 Note that this distinction is fully determined by exogenous parameters. Appendix B
describes the relevant PCs as a function of ε and the spouses’ risk aversion.
Clearly, any contract which is the outcome of (constrained-)efficient risk sharing must
satisfy one of the two previous conditions. From now on, we restrict our attention to candidate
contracts defined accordingly.
9If x (i,W ) = x (j,M), the autarky and the perfect-risk-sharing outcomes are the same, and no transfers
are needed.
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Definition 4 (Candidate contracts). We say that a contract Cij (v; β, ε) is a candidate if
it is feasible and it satisfies x (i, Cij (v; β, ε)) ≥ x (j, Z − Cij (v; β, ε)) (≤) given x (i,W ) ≥
x (j,M) (≤).
Having determined the direction of transfers in each state, we wish to identify when risk
aversion helps to commit to positive transfers. To do so, we first define a notion of advantage
of a woman (man) over another.
Definition 5 (Advantage). We say that Ms i has an advantage over Ms i˜ when sharing
risk with Mr j, given β and ε, if every candidate contract for the couple 〈˜i, j〉 satisfies the
PCs of Ms i. That is, if Ci˜j (v; β, ε) =
(
ci˜j (v; β, ε) , ci˜j (v; β, ε)
)
is a candidate contract, then
u
(
i, ci˜j (v; β, ε)
)
+
β
1− βEu
(
i, Ci˜j (v; β, ε)
) ≥ u(i, 1 + εy) + β
1− βEu(i,W ),
u
(
i, ci˜j (v; β, ε)
)
+
β
1− βEu
(
i, Ci˜j (v; β, ε)
) ≥ u(i, 1− εy) + β
1− βEu(i,W );
and similarly for men.
Given our definition, we are now ready to determine under which condition more risk-
averse agents have an advantage, and when less risk-averse agents do.
Lemma 1. Take β and ε as given.
(i) If for all candidate contracts C for the couple 〈i′, j〉 the woman’s consumption is less
Jewitt-risky than her income, i.e., C %SC W , then Ms i′′ has an advantage;
(ii) If for all candidate contracts C for the couple 〈i′′, j〉 the woman’s consumption is more
Jewitt-risky than her income, i.e., C -SC W , then Ms i′ has an advantage;
and similarly for men.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Intuitively, Lemma 1 provides conditions on the endogenous sharing rules which determine
whether heterogenous or homogenous couples have a comparative advantage in enforcing
risk sharing. In particular, if consumption of both men and women are less risky than
their respective endowments, then more risk-averse agents have an advantage, and hence
homogenous couples can sustain more risk sharing. On the other hand, if consumption is
more risky than income on one side of the market but less risky on the other side, heterogenous
couples have a comparative advantage.
Next we determine whether a reduction in risk on one side of the market increases the
partner’s risk. The following lemma provides sufficient conditions for two cases: if risk is
reduced on the women’s side, then risk must increase (decrease) on the men’s side.
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Lemma 2. Let C and C˜ be candidate contracts, and assume that C˜ is an increased spread
of C.
(i) If C, C˜ ∈ C−, then the man’s consumption Z − C is a reduced spread of Z − C˜;
(ii) If C, C˜ ∈ C+, then the man’s consumption Z − C is an increased spread of Z − C˜.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Lemma 2 provides conditions under which we have a clear answer to the question which
side of the market provides insurance to the other. Part (i) concerns situations in which
there is scope for mutual insurance. If the commitment problem is severe, a couple may
fail to insure idiosyncratic (zero-sum) risk sufficiently, and the woman may consume more
in state s; while men always consume more in state s. In this case, a marginal increase in
transfers reduces consumption risk on both sides. Instead, part (ii) concerns situations in
which spouses’ consumption processes are comonotone. In this case, consumption risk on the
men’s side can only be reduced at the expense of increased risk on the women’s side, hence
women provide insurance to men; or vice versa.10
Lemmas 1 and 2 are key to provide sufficient conditions for PAM and NAM with limited
commitment. Combined, they also contain the main intuition for when types are compliments
or substitutes. Intuitively, PAM requires (i) more risk-averse agents to have an advantage on
both sides of the market, and (ii) that spouses can mutually reduce their consumption risk
through transfers. Similarly, NAM requires (i) less risk-averse agents on one side and more
risk-averse agents on the other side to have an advantage, and (ii) that a reduction of risk on
one side increases risk on the other side of the market. Next we make these statements formal
and provide sufficient conditions on the exogenous parameters of the model that guarantee
them.
We first provide a sufficient condition for GDD, and in turn NAM. We seek restrictions
on parameters which result in a comparative advantage for couples with more diverse risk
attitudes. First, we need that partners cannot mutually reduce consumption risk through
transfers. That is, we need that any candidate contract C be more Jewitt-risky than the
woman’s endowment if and only if the man’s contract Z − C is less Jewitt-risky than his
endowment. In this case, by Lemma 1, a less risk-averse woman and a more risk-averse man
have comparative advantages. Second, we seek that competing candidate contracts C and C˜
be ranked by Jewitt’s order as follows: C %SC C˜ if and only if the opposite ranking holds on
the men’s side, i.e., Z − C˜ %SC Z −C. That is, among any two candidate contracts, the one
10Note that Lemma 2 does not extend to cases in which the contracts C and C˜ are not comonotone. In
this case, Z − C and Z − C˜ cannot be ranked in general.
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that is less Jewitt-risky for women is more Jewitt-risky for men, and vice versa; case (ii) of
Lemma 2. It turns out that both of these conditions are satisfied whenever ε ≥ 0, hence we
have the following result:
Proposition 2. If ε ≥ 0, then the economy satisfies NAM.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Proposition 2 says that, as long as endowments covary positively, the NAM result under
full commitment is robust to limited commitment. Note, however, that if the commitment
problem is so severe that no couple can commit to positive transfers, the economy trivially
satisfies both PAM and NAM according to Definition 2. This is because, in this case, each
agent gets their autarky utility in any potential couple, hence any matching is stable according
to Definition 1.
We now turn to showing that this is not true when endowments covary negatively. We
first provide a sufficient condition for PAM in terms of equilibrium objects. This will be
useful to determine sorting in terms of the exogenous parameters of our model below.
Lemma 3. If Cij (v; β, ε) ∈ C− for all v and for all 〈i, j〉, then the economy satisfies PAM.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Lemma 3 says that PAM obtains whenever women’s consumption is weakly higher in state s
than in state s. In other words, whenever spouses’ consumptions violate comonotonicity, we
have PAM. Note that this property is contrary to what happens under perfect risk sharing
in the presence of aggregate risk.
Consider first the case where ε = −1, i.e., there is no aggregate risk and women’s income
is 1−y in state s and 1+y in state s. In this case, even efficient transfers satisfy the sufficient
condition for PAM of Lemma 3, since they result in equal consumptions in the two states.
Therefore, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. If ε = −1, then the economy satisfies PAM.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Notice that PAM holds for any β when the joint endowment is constant, whatever the
level of risk sharing. The case of ε = −1 has the unique property that the partner’s ability
to share aggregate risk is irrelevant, even if the couple achieves efficient risk sharing. At
the same time, a partner’s risk aversion always increases the set of candidate contracts. As
a result, more risk-averse agents are more attractive risk-sharing partners on both sides of
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the market to anyone on the opposite side. However, given that the joint endowment is
constant, when β is high enough to allow perfect risk sharing in all potential couples, we can
generate a new payoff-equivalent stable matching by rearranging partners, hence both PAM
and NAM hold. Similarly, if β is so low that no potential couple achieves positive transfers,
the economy satisfies both PAM and NAM (as in the case of ε ≥ 0, see above).
With aggregate risk, i.e., ε > −1, all efficient risk-sharing contracts prescribe strictly
higher consumption for both partners in s. Therefore, the sufficient condition for PAM in
Lemma 3 requires all couples to be constrained in equilibrium. Moreover, if incomes are
comonotone, i.e., ε ≥ 0, any constrained-efficient transfer must preserve comonotonicity of
consumptions. As a result, the sufficient condition for PAM requires that idiosyncratic risk
is great enough to satisfy ε < 0.
In the following we determine the set of exogenous parameters, β and ε, which give rise
to our sufficient condition, Cij (v; β, ε) ∈ C− for all v and for all 〈i, j〉, given y and the
current utility functions. Intuitively, we need the commitment problem to be severe such
that consumptions fail to be comonotone.
In order to state our main result, let Ms I (Mr J) be the most risk-averse woman (man).
Proposition 4. For any ε < 0 there exists a discount factor β(ε) ∈ (0, 1) such that the
economy satisfies PAM for all β ≤ β(ε). Further, the threshold discount factor is implicitly
given by
CIJ
(
v; β(ε), ε
) ∈ C− for all v and CIJ (v; β(ε), ε) ∈ C− ∩C+ for some v.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Proposition 4 says that the economy satisfies PAM when incomes covary negatively and the
discount factor is sufficiently low. Contrary to the case where ε = −1, each couple faces
aggregate risk, hence heterogeneity in risk preferences may be beneficial. Still, more risk-
averse agents on both sides of the market have an advantage in sharing idiosyncratic risk.
Our result shows that the latter can dominate when transfers are sufficiently constrained,
which corresponds to lower discount factors, everything else equal.
The comparative statics with respect to ε are not as clear-cut. While an increase in β
relaxes all PCs unambiguously, the comparative statics with respect to ε are not monotone.
Decreasing a negative ε increases a woman’s idiosyncratic income risk from an ex-ante per-
spective. However, depending on her risk preferences, this change may increase or decrease
her autarky utility conditional on a high current income realisation (which is when her PC
is binding). As a result, the PC may tighten or relax as ε decreases.
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Nonetheless, we are able to identify situations in which both relevant PCs unambiguously
tighten (or relax) as ε changes. These allow us to determine the comparative statics of the
commitment problem with respect to ε, and in turn to provide sufficient conditions for PAM.
To state our result, let εI(β) (εJ(β)) denote the level of ε where Ms I enjoys the highest
possible sure consumption such that her (Mr J ’s) PC holds as equality.11
Proposition 5. Assume that CIJ
(
v; β(ε0), ε0
) ∈ C− for all v holds for some ε0 ∈ [−1, 0).
(i) If εJ(β) ≤ ε0 ≤ εI(β), then the economy satisfies PAM for all ε ∈ [ε0, εI(β)].
(ii) If εI(β) ≤ ε0 ≤ εJ(β), then the economy satisfies PAM for all ε ∈ [εJ(β), ε0].
Proof. In Appendix A.
Below we show that non-monotonicity may arise by a numerical example as well, see
Section 3.1.1.
To summarise, we have shown that for ε = −1, the economy satisfies PAM. Further, for
any −1 < ε < 0, we have provided sufficient conditions for PAM in terms of the PCs of
the two most risk-averse agents on each side of the market. If PCs of Ms I and Mr J are
tight enough for consumption not to be comonotone after transfers, then more risk-averse
agents are more attractive partners. Moreover, we have shown that the sufficient condition
holds when agents are impatient enough, i.e., β is below a threshold β(ε), which depends on
exogenous parameters only. However, the comparative statics of the PCs with respect to ε
are not monotone on the interval (-1,0). In other words, β(ε) is not monotone in ε.
The intuition for our results in this section is as follows. When efficient transfers are not
credible, a partner may become more attractive if he or she considers autarky a more severe
punishment. The extent of the commitment problem is therefore unambiguously increasing
(decreasing) in risk aversion if transfers make consumption more (less) Jewitt-risky than
income. For ε < 0 and low β, transfers reduce consumption risk on both sides of the market,
while for ε ≥ 0, transfers increase risk on one side while decreasing it on the other side. The
clear sorting prediction in these cases exploits that the competing offers of two women for any
given man can be ranked in terms of Jewitt’s order. The sorting of couples for intermediate
cases with ε < 0 and high β may be positive assortative if the sorting is driven by the couples’
ability to pool idiosyncratic risk, negative if it is driven by the allocation of uninsurable risk,
or non-monotone.12
11See formal definition in Appendix A.
12For instance, consider a group of men and women i′L, i
′′
L, i
′
H , i
′′
H with i
′
L < i
′′
L < i
′
H < i
′′
H , and j
′
L, j
′′
L, j
′
H , j
′′
H
with j′L < j
′′
L < j
′
H < j
′′
H . Let β be sufficiently high to allow for efficient risk sharing in any couple formed by
Ms i′L or i
′′
L and Mr j
′
H or j
′′
H . Therefore, by the standard negative-sorting result for efficient risk sharing,
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We want to emphasise that our comparative statics results do not require the outside
options to correspond to autarky or, more generally, to be exogenous. Consider, for instance,
a situation in which the outside option is a convex combination between continuation values
inside and outside the marriage. This accommodates a situation in which spouses withhold
transfers for 0 < k ≤ ∞ periods, or where a separated agent can remarry only after k periods.
That is, the man does not benefit from risk sharing for k periods, and we assume that he can
expect to get the same level of lifetime utility, v, thereafter. The man’s constraint (5) would
then become
u (j, z − c) + β − β
k+1
1− β Eu(j, Z − C) ≥ u(j,m) +
β − βk+1
1− β Eu(j,M),
where (β − βk+1)/(1 − β) = ∑kt=1 βt. Our benchmark case corresponds to k = ∞. A
finite k clearly affects the set of sharing rules which are self-enforcing. However, it does not
affect the comparative statics with respect to risk aversion in our analysis. Moreover, we can
accommodate a gender-specific k. Similarly, the outside options could be any gender-specific
i.i.d. processes, W out for women and M out for men, for example additional punishment for
deviating could be taken into account. In short, as long as the set of candidate sharing
rules in any couple 〈i, j〉 can be compared to the outside option by Jewitt’s single-crossing
condition, our results apply.
3.1.1 A numerical example
To see how β(ε) changes with ε and to illustrate the strength of our sufficient condition for
PAM, we consider a set of parameterised economies and compute β(ε) for all ε ∈ (−1, 0). In
addition, we provide the values of β∗(ε), the threshold discount factor below which the couple
〈I, J〉 and hence all potential couples are in autarky, and β∗∗(ε), the threshold discount factor
above which the least risk-averse couple and hence all potential couples achieve perfect risk
sharing.13
For this purpose, we consider economies with two men and two women whose risk pref-
erences satisfy constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), in particular, u(i′, c) = u(j′, c) =
the stable matching must include the couples 〈i′L, j′′H〉 and 〈i′L, j′′H〉. Now let Cw =
(
ci′′H (β, ε) , ci′′H (β, ε)
)
.
Then, for any β, we can construct a utility function for Mr j′′L such that Z −Cw satisfies his PC as equality.
Therefore, all candidate contracts for the couple 〈i′′H , j′′L〉 must belong to C−. Moreover, the PC of Mr j′L
is more stringent than the one of Mr j′′L. Similarly, the PC of Ms i
′
H is more stringent than the one of
Ms i′′H for all candidate contracts with Mr j
′
L and Mr j
′′
L. As a result, no stable matching includes the
couples 〈i′′H , j′L〉 and 〈i′H , j′′L〉 at the same time. By the above, there exists a profile of utility promises
such that the only stable matching is {〈i′Hj′L〉, 〈i′′Hj′′L〉, 〈i′Lj′′H〉, 〈i′′Lj′H〉}. To summarise, i′′H ≥ i′H ≥ i′′L while
µ(i′′H) = j
′′
L ≥ µ(i′H) = j′L ≤ µ(i′′L) = j′′H , hence monotonicity is violated.
13Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) show that β∗(ε) exists. β∗∗(ε) exists by a standard folk-theorem
result, see Kimball (1988) and Kocherlakota (1996).
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c1−1.5/(1 − 1.5) = −2/√c and u(i′′, c) = u(j′′, c) = c1−2/(1 − 2) = −1/c. The coefficient of
relative risk aversion is therefore 1.5 for Ms i′ and Mr j′ and 2 for Ms i′′ and Mr j′′. Further,
we set y = 0.1, hence men’s income is M = (1.1, 0.9).
Figure 1 plots β(ε), β∗(ε), and β∗∗(ε) for all ε ∈ (−1, 0). Given ε, our sufficient condition
for PAM is satisfied for all β ≤ β(ε). Pairs of parameters ε and β in the shaded area
correspond to cases where PAM holds and at least the most risk-averse couple shares risk
partially.14 When all potential couples are in autarky, both PAM and NAM hold. When all
couples share risk efficiently, NAM holds for all ε, and PAM holds in addition to NAM in
the special case of ε = −1. Finally, when ε = −1 and β is such that some couples achieve
some but less than perfect risk sharing, we know that PAM holds.
Figure 1: PAM with static contracts
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Notes: β(ε) is the discount factor below which Ci′′j′′ (v;β, ε) ∈ C− for all v, a sufficient condition for PAM.
β∗(ε) is the discount factor below which no transfers are self-enforcing for the couple 〈i′′, j′′〉. β∗∗(ε) is the
discount factor above which perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing in the long run for the couple 〈i′, j′〉. The
shaded area highlights the combinations of ε and β for which our sufficient condition for PAM holds when
ε ∈ [−1, 0) and at least the couple 〈i′′, j′′〉 achieves partial risk sharing.
14While our sufficient conditions for PAM do not imply the absence of NAM, we have not been able to find
a stable matching that is negative assortative for β ∈ (β∗(ε), β(ε)].
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In Figure 2 we plot β(ε) separately as a function of ε. Its hump shape illustrates that, for
some values of β, PAM may not hold if ε is too close to either 0 or −1. For example when
β = 0.90005, our sufficient condition is satisfied for all ε ∈ [−0.87,−0.42].
Figure 2: PAM with static contracts – non-monotonicity of β(ε)
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Notes: β(ε) is the discount factor below which Ci′′j′′ (v;β, ε) ∈ C− for all v, a sufficient condition for PAM.
3.2 Dynamic contracts
The static contracts discussed in the previous section are not constrained efficient in a dy-
namic risk-sharing model with limited commitment (Thomas and Worrall, 1988; Kocher-
lakota, 1996). That is, Ms i could provide the expected per-period utility v to Mr j and
increase her own utility by proposing a self-enforcing dynamic contract, which conditions
on the entire history of income realisations. To allow for history-depending contracts when
determining sorting, we need to turn to numerical methods. The aim of this section is to
demonstrate that the existence of positive-assortative matchings is robust to constrained-
efficient risk sharing.
To characterise dynamic contracts, we need additional notation. Let st ∈ {s, s} denote the
state of the world at time t, let st = (s1, s2, ..., st) denote the history of state realisations up to
and including time t, and let Pr (st) denote its probability. Further, let c (st) (z (st)− c (st))
denote consumption by the woman (the man) at time t when history st has occurred. The
optimal contract solves
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max
{c(st)}
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
Pr
(
st
)
βt−1u
(
i, c
(
st
))
s. t.
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
Pr
(
st
)
βt−1u
(
j, c
(
st
)) ≥ 1
1− β v,
u
(
i, c
(
st−1, s
))
+
∞∑
r=t+1
∑
sr⊃st
Pr
(
sr | st)βr−tu (i, c (sr)) ≥ u (i, w) + β
1− βEu (i,W ) ,∀s
t,
u
(
i, c
(
st−1, s
))
+
∞∑
r=t+1
∑
sr⊃st
Pr
(
sr | st)βr−tu (i, c (sr)) ≥ u (i, w) + β
1− βEu (i,W ) ,∀s
t,
u
(
j, z (s)− c (st−1, s))+ ∞∑
r=t+1
∑
sr⊃st
Pr
(
sr | st)βr−tu (j, z (sr)− c (sr)) ≥ u (j,m) + β
1− βEu (j,M) ,∀s
t,
u
(
j, z (s)− c (st−1, s))+ ∞∑
r=t+1
∑
sr⊃st
Pr
(
sr | st)βr−tu (j, z (sr)− c (sr)) ≥ u (j,m) + β
1− βEu (j,M) ,∀s
t,
where Pr (sr | st) is the probability of history sr ⊃ st occurring given that history st occurred
up to time t.
The characterisation of constrained-efficient allocations in endowment economies with
limited commitment has been established in the literature, see Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon,
Thomas, and Worrall (2002), and others. While this literature typically focuses on the
properties of the long-run allocations, we are interested in matching at time 0. That is, we
need to take into account the transition to the long-run equilibrium, which allows promises of
expected per-period utility above or below the long-run utility. During the possible transition
period, no PC is binding and the sharing rule is determined by the utility promise to the
man. As a result, we may need to determine a third level of consumption which may occur
during the transition period, in addition to the long-run consumptions in states s and s. Let
cˆ denote the woman’s consumption during the possible transition period, i.e., before any PC
binds.15
Let β∗ denote the discount factor below which autarky is the only feasible allocation and
let β∗∗ denote the discount factor above which efficient risk sharing is self-enforcing in the
long run, as before. Then, for given preferences and income processes, the following cases
may occur for a couple 〈i, j〉 depending on β and v:
(i) β ≤ β∗. There is no transition. Consumption only takes two values, which are equal to
the endowments, and the solution is independent of v.
(ii) β∗ < β < β∗∗. Both relevant PCs bind in the long run, and they pin down the long-run
15Note that the transition period is finite with probability one. For instance, if the state space is binary,
then period t features the long-run sharing rule if both states s and s occurred prior to t.
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consumption values, which are independent of v.16 If the promised utility equals the
expected long-run per-period utility, vLR, then there is no transition, a PC binds already
at time 1, and consumption is determined by the two long-run values. Otherwise, there
may be a transition period in which no PC binds. For v < vLR (v > vLR), cˆ is larger
(smaller) than the long-run consumption values, and it is realised if the man happens to
have low (high) income initially. The maximum (minimum) sustainable cˆ, and therefore
the range of utility promises, is pinned down by the relevant PC of the man (woman)
in the transition state.17
(iii) β∗∗ ≤ β. Efficient risk sharing occurs in the long run and v matters. For intermediate
values of v, no PC ever binds, hence there is no transition, and two consumption values
occur overall. For low and high values of v, one PC eventually binds in one period. If
this happens at t ≥ 2, there is a transition period, and three consumption values occur
overall. The long-run consumption values are pinned down by the woman’s relevant PC
if v is high and by the man’s relevant PC if v is low, along with the efficiency condition
that the ratios of marginal utilities across states of the two spouses are equal.18
Whenever the transition consumption values can differ from their long-run levels, the con-
tract is dynamic. That is, we need to take a novel effect into account when analysing the
assortativity of stable matchings: whether risk aversion enhances or constrains an agent’s
ability to transfer utility during the transition. Beyond the added difficulties due to the dy-
namic nature of the contract, an analytical approach is further complicated by the fact that
competing contracts need not satisfy Jewitt’s single-crossing condition when consumption
takes three values or more. Therefore, we turn to numerical methods to check whether our
results extend to the general model allowing for history-dependent contracts.
To show that stable matchings can be positive assortative with dynamic contracts as well,
we revisit our numerical example. Recall that y = 0.1 and u(i′, c) = u(j′, c) = c1−1.5/(1 −
1.5) = −2/√c and u(i′′, c) = u(j′′, c) = c1−2/(1− 2) = −1/c. We set ε = −0.1 and β = 0.9.
Given these parameter values, the couples 〈i′, j′〉 and 〈i′′, j′〉 cannot sustain positive transfers,
hence the expected lifetime utility of Mr j′ is equal to the value of autarky. However, when
in the couple 〈i′, j′′〉, Ms i′ enjoys a long-run consumption of 0.99935 and 1.00222 in states s
and s, respectively. Making Ms i′ indifferent between her two potential partners requires a
transition consumption of 0.99 in state s. This contract gives Mr j′′ an expected per-period
16See Proposition 4.2 in Kocherlakota (1996).
17These statements follow form the updating rule for the relative Pareto weight as shown in Proposition 1
of Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002).
18Proposition 4.1 and related discussion in Kocherlakota (1996) establish this characterisation.
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utility of −1.008526. Finally, for the couple 〈i′′, j′′〉, the long-run consumption values of the
woman are 1.000896 and 1.000905, respectively. A transition consumption of the woman of
0.9935 in state s makes Mr j′′ indifferent between his two potential partners, and makes Ms i′′
better off than when she shares risk with Mr j′. Hence, we have found a stable matching
that is positive assortative.
The intuition for the fact that allowing for a transition does not overturn the assortativity
of the stable matching in our example is that more risk-averse agents are still able to commit
to more risk sharing. To see this, denote the contract which satisfies both relevant PCs
as equality in the long run by CLRij (β, ε). Our sufficient condition for PAM of Lemma 3 is
equivalent to the property CLRij (β, ε) ∈ C−. Moreover, consumption in the transition period
lies between [1+εy, 1−εy], otherwise a PC would be violated. This implies that the dynamic
contract is less Jewitt-risky than the endowment, hence more risk-averse agents still have an
advantage on both sides of the matching market.
4 Concluding remarks
Recent theoretical literature on the marriage problem (two-sided, one-to-one matching) in
endowment economies with imperfectly transferable utility and no search frictions predicts
that matching is always negative assortative with respect to spouses’ risk attitudes. In this
paper we have shown that this finding is not robust to relaxing the assumption of efficient
risk sharing once matches are formed. When commitment is limited, positive-assortative
matching can occur.19
The reason for positive assortativity is that more risk-averse agents can be more attrac-
tive risk-sharing partners when their relevant PC is less stringent, which happens when their
consumption is less risky than their income in the sense of Jewitt. When incomes are neg-
atively correlated and the discount factor is sufficiently low, this effect dominates the gains
from diversity in risk preferences when sharing uninsurable risk.
Our result of positive-assortative matching on risk attitudes is in line with recent empir-
ical evidence by Bacon, Conte, and Moffatt (2014) on married couples, who use the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which contains a measure of risk preferences. The authors’
preferred estimate of the correlation coefficient between spouses’ risk aversion is 0.285. Fur-
19In a similar vein, Ghatak and Karaivanov (2014) find that frictions on both sides of a market can reverse
sorting from the first-best case. They consider the effect of double-sided moral hazard among risk-neutral
landlords and tenants who produce output jointly and are heterogenous in their specialisation type. They
show that while heterogeneous pairs maximise first-best surplus, this effect may be dominated by the reduced
friction in homogeneous couples.
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ther, Shore (2015) estimates that spouses’ incomes remain negatively correlated for at least
20 years, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In addition, he finds positive-
assortative matching with respect to volatility of incomes, and argues that this may be
optimal given positive-assortative matching in risk aversion. While our model assumes that
income processes are homogeneous and exogenous on each side of the market, our results
may help resolve the tension between theories in which agents match to take risk, which
predict homogeneous couples, and those where agents match to share risk, which predicted
heterogeneous couples. Our paper suggests that risk sharing may also favour homogeneous
couples.
Considering a second application, firms and workers, Falco (2014) studies the role of risk
aversion in the allocation of workers between formal and informal jobs in Ghana, and finds
that more risk-averse workers are less likely to have jobs in the informal sector, where income
uncertainty is higher. Arguably, informal firms are smaller and behave in a more risk-averse
fashion, hence positive-assortative matching obtains.
Our mechanism that lack of commitment provides a motive for positive-assortative match-
ing could be tested using an exogenous change in enforcement technology. The widespread
adoption of unilateral divorce laws in the United States in the 1970s could be looked at from
this perspective. Employment laws that make it more likely that an entrepreneur and a
worker separate would also be a force toward positive-assortative matching according to our
theory. We leave this to future work.
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Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Efficient risk sharing requires consumption to lie in C+ for both
risk sharing partners, Ms i and Mr j. Define the crossing point X(j, v) ∈ C+ for each
(j, v) pair as C∗(i′, j, v) ∼i′ X(j, v) ∼i′′ C∗(i′′, j, v). By revealed preference, C∗(i′, j, v) %i′
X(j, v) %i′ C∗(i′′, j, v) and C∗(i′′, j, v) %i′′ X(j, v) %i′′ C∗(i′, j, v). Hence,
C∗(i′′, j, v) %SC X(j, v) %SC C∗(i′, j, v), ∀(j, v), (7)
since Ms i′′ is more risk averse than Ms i′ by assumption. Suppose the premise of (GDD), i.e.,
Ms i′′ prefers to share risk with Mr j′′ rather than Mr j′. By revealed preference over partners,
Eu(j′, Z −C∗i′′j′′(v′′)) ≤ v′. Otherwise, if Mr j′’s utility constraint could be satisfied with the
offer made to Mr j′′, then Mr j′′ would not be a preferred partner. Suppose first that Mr j′′
agrees with Mr j′ on the ranking of the two offers, i.e., Eu(j′′, Z − C∗i′′j′(v′)) ≥ v′′. Then (7)
together with (Z−C) ∈ C+ implies Z−C∗i′j′(v′) %SC Z−C∗i′′j′(v′). Therefore, Z−C∗i′j′(v′) %j′′
Z − C∗i′′j′(v′) %j′′ Z − C∗i′′j′′(v′′) and Eu(j′′, Z − C∗i′j′(v′)) ≥ v′′. A standard separating
hyperplane argument implies that Ms i′ can find a C %i′ C∗i′j′(v′) which provides exactly v′′ to
Mr j′′. That is, Ms i′ can always outbid Ms i′′ and match with Mr j′′. Suppose now that Mr j′′
disagrees with Mr j′ on the ranking of the two offers, i.e., now Z−C∗i′′j′′(v′′) %j′′ Z−C∗i′′j′(v′).
Then ∃ C˜ ∈ C+ such that Eu(j′, Z − C˜) = v′ and Eu(j′′, Z − C˜) = v′′. The disagreement
implies
C∗i′′j′(v
′) %SC C˜ %SC C∗i′′j′′(v′′).
If C∗i′j′(v′) %SC C˜, then we know that X(j′, v′) %SC C˜ %SC X(j′′, v′′). Then, given that the
more risk-averse agent Ms i′′ prefers to match with Mr j′′ by assumption, i.e., she prefers
the more risky lottery X(j′′, v′′) over the less risky lottery X(j′, v′), it must be that the
less risk-averse agent Ms i′ also prefers X(j′′, v′′) over X(j′, v′). Further, (7) implies that
Z − C∗i′j′′(v′′) %j′′ Z − C∗i′′j′′(v′′). If C˜ %SC C∗i′j′(v′), then Z − C∗i′j′(v′) %j′′ Z − C˜ ∼j′′
Z − C∗i′′j′′(v′′), and again there exists a contract C which is preferred by Ms i′ and grants
Mr j′′ exactly v′′, hence NAM.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume first that the relevant PC is (3). Multiplying both sides of the
inequality (3) by (1 − β), we can express (3) in terms of a static expected utility criterion
which compares C and W as
[(1− β) + βPr (s)]u (i, c) + βPr (s)u (i, c) ≥ [(1− β) + βPr (s)]u (i, w) + βPr (s)u (i, w) .
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Consider first part (i), where C is assumed less Jewitt-risky than W . By the definition of
Jewitt’s order, whenever the above inequality holds for Ms i′, then it must also hold for Ms i′′,
which proves (i). Assume now that the relevant PC is (4). Multiplying both sides of the
inequality in (4) by (1 − β) yields a similar expected utility criterion which assigns weight
[(1− β) + βPr (s)] to state s and βPr (s) to state s. According to Jewitt’s order, whenever
C %SC W satisfies the inequality for Ms i′ it must also satisfy the inequality for Ms i′′, which
proves (i). Applying an analogous argument to the cases where W %SC C proves (ii). To
show the results for men, we can apply a similar argument using the inequalities (5) and (6)
and the riskiness of payoffs Z − C and M .
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we show that any candidate contract C must satisfy Z−C ∈ C+.
Since m ≥ m, we have that the man’s individual income M is comonotone with aggregate
income Z. Moreover, since z ≥ z, the inequality z− c ≤ z− c can only hold if women make a
transfer in state s such that c ≥ c. It follows that x(i, C) ≤ 1 while x(j,M) ≤ 1 ≤ x(j, Z−C).
Then, since individual rationality requires x(i, C) ≤ x(j, Z−C) ≤ x(j,M) whenever x(i, C) ≤
x(j,M), we have a contradiction. Therefore, we know that Z − C,Z − C˜ ∈ C+, for all
candidate contracts. Now part (i) obtains directly from the assumption C,D ∈ C−, which
guarantees that d ≤ c ≤ c ≤ d if and only if z − d ≥ z − c ≥ z − c ≥ z − d. Similarly,
part (ii) is now a direct consequence of the assumption C,D ∈ C+, which guarantees that
d ≥ c ≥ c ≥ d if and only if z − c ≥ z − d ≥ z − d ≥ z − c.
Proof of Proposition 2. The assumption ε ≥ 0 means that both endowments M and W
belong to C+, which in turn implies that the same is true for all candidate contracts. Then,
from Lemma 2 we know that a positive transfer results in a reduction in risk on one side of
the market and an increase in risk on the other side. Formally, if x(i,W ) > x(j,M) then
W %SC Cij (v; β, ε) and Z − Cij (v; β, ε) %SC M , and if x(i,M) ≤ x(j,M) then W -SC
Cij (v; β, ε) and Z − Cij (v; β, ε) -SC M .
Assume for now that x(i,W ) − x(j,M) ≥ 0 for all 〈i, j〉. This implies that the relevant
PC for women is (4) in all couples 〈i, j〉. Then, by Lemma 1, Ms i′ has an advantage over
Ms i′′, while Mr j′′ has an advantage over Mr j′. To show GDD in this case, we proceed
analogously to Lemma 3.
If Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) satisfies the PKC of Mr j′′, we have GDD directly, since Ms i′ cannot do
worse than Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) when she faces the less stringent PC (5) of Mr j′′.
Suppose instead that Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) violates the PKC of Mr j′′. We first show that
Ci′′j′′ (v
′′; β, ε) is more Jewitt-risky than Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) in this case. Assume indirectly the
opposite. Then, by the revealed preference of Ms i′′ for Mr j′′, the contract Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε)
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satisfies the PKC of Mr j′′ while either the PC (5) or the PKC of Mr j′ must be binding or
violated. The PKCs of Mr j′ and j′′ cross at most once on C+. Moreover, the PC (5) of Mr j′
and the PKC of Mr j′′ also cross at most once on C+, since the former can be expressed as
a pivoted, steeper PKC of Mr j′, which reinforces the single-crossing property of two PKCs.
Therefore, any contract which is more Jewitt-risky than Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) and satisfies both the
PC (5) and the PKC of Mr j′ must also satisfy the PKC of Mr j′′. However, since this set of
contracts includes Ci′j′(v′; β, ε) by our indirect assumption, we have a contradiction to our
initial assumption that Ci′j′(v′; β, ε) violates the PKC of Mr j′′.
Now, assume that Ms i′ could improve upon Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) by the less Jewitt-risky con-
tract Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε). Since Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) satisfies the PC (5) of Mr j′′, any reduced spread
which is preferred by Ms i′ must also be preferred by Ms i′′. Moreover, the PC of Ms i′′
cannot be violated by a reduced spread which does not reduce her expected utility, hence
Ci′j′ (v
′; β, ε) must also satisfy the PC (4) of Ms i′′. But since Ms i′′ revealed that such a
contract cannot be better than Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε), we obtain Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′′ Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε).
Then, by Jewitt’s order, we have Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′ Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε). Further, since Ms i′ has an
advantage over Ms i′′, we obtain Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′ Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) and GDD.
Next we relax the assumption that x(i,W )− x(j,M) ≥ 0 for all couples 〈i, j〉. Consider
first the case where x(i,W ) − x(j,M) ≤ 0 for all 〈i, j〉. We can state the analogue of GDD
when men propose a contract to women as a sufficient condition for NAM. Proceeding as
above, we obtain that Mr j′ is willing and able to outbid Mr j′′ whenever the lifetime utility
promises to women are such that Mr j′′ prefers Ms i′′.
What remains to be shown is that GDD also holds in all cases where the sign of x(i,W )−
x(j,M) varies across couples. From Lemma 7 in Appendix B we know that as ε increases
from 0 to 1, the first couple to switch (from positive to negative sign) is 〈i′′, j′〉 and the last is
〈i′, j′′〉. This implies that if there is variation in the sign of x(i,W )− x(j,M), these couples
are among those who have opposite signs, i.e., it must be that x(i′,W ) − x(j′′,M) ≥ 0 and
x(i′′,W )− x(j′,M) ≤ 0.
Consider first the case where x(i′,W ) − x(j′,M) ≥ 0. In this case, Ms i′ makes a non-
negative transfer in state s for all j and her relevant PC is (4). Consider first the subcase
where x(i′′,W )− x(j′′,M) ≤ 0. That is, Ms i′′ makes a non-negative transfer in state s and
her relevant PC is Ms (3), ∀j. Then, we know that Ci′′j (v; β, ε) %SC W %SC Ci′j (v; β, ε),
∀j. Further, considering both men sharing risk with Ms i′′, from Lemma 2 we know that
Z − Ci′′j (v; β, ε) -SC M , ∀j, and in turn Lemma 1 implies that Mr j′ has an advantage.
Therefore, the preference of Ms i′′ for Mr j′′ reveals that the PKC of Mr j′ cannot be slack at
Ci′′j′′ (v
′′; β, ε). Therefore, Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) is more Jewitt-risky than the single-crossing point
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of the two PKCs. As a result, for any C such that Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %SC C, we know that
C must also be more Jewitt-risky than the single crossing point. Hence, if C satisfies the
PKC of Mr j′, then it satisfies the PKC of Mr j′′ too. But since Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %SC W %SC
Ci′j′ (v
′; β, ε), we know that the PKC of Mr j′′ must be slack at Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε). Hence we have
Ci′j′′ (v
′′; β, ε) %i′ Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε), i.e., GDD.
Second, consider the subcase where x(i′′,W )−x(j′′,M) ≥ 0. In this case, Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε) %SC
W %SC Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) while Ci′j (v′; β, ε) -SC W , ∀j. First note that Ms i′′ and Mr j′
can only mutually prefer a contract to autarky which is less Jewitt-risky than W , since
x(i′′,W ) − x(j′,M) ≤ 0. At the same time, we have W %SC Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε). Further, by
individual rationality of Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε), we have Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′′ W . Hence it must be that
M %j′ Z − Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε). As a result, the PKC of Mr j′ cannot be slack at Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε).
Consider first any Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) which is more Jewitt-risky than Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε). In this
case, the single-crossing property of PKCs implies that Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) must also satisfy the
PKC of Mr j′′. Further, from Lemma 2 we know that Z − Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) %SC M , and in
turn Lemma 1 implies that Mr j′′ has an advantage, and we have GDD. Alternatively, as-
sume that Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) is less Jewitt-risky than Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε). However, we know that
Ms i′′ and Mr j′ cannot mutually prefer Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) to autarky since x(i′,W ) − x(j′,M)
and x(i′′,W ) − x(j′,M) do not have the same sign. Moreover, by individual rationality,
Ci′j′ (v
′; β, ε) cannot be worse than autarky for Mr j′. Therefore W %i′′ Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε).
However, by individual rationality of the couple 〈i′′, j′′〉, we know that Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′′
W . Hence, Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′′ W %i′′ Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε). Using Jewitt’s order, this implies
Ci′′j′′ (v
′′; β, ε) %i′ Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε), and we have GDD.
Consider now the case where x(i′,W )− x(j′,M) ≤ 0, that is, Ms i′ switches the state of
transfer between Mr j′ and Mr j′′. Consider first the subcase where x(i′′,W )−x(j′′,M) ≤ 0,
i.e., Ms i′′ makes a non-negative transfer in state s, ∀j. This proof is analogous to the previous
case. The remaining subcase concerns x(i′′,W ) − x(j′′,M) ≥ 0. In this case, both women
make a non-negative transfer in state s when sharing risk with Mr j′′, and in state s when
with Mr j′. That is, women’s consumption is more (less) Jewitt-risky than their income when
with Mr j′′ (Mr j′). Notice that GDD is logically equivalent to:
Ci′j′ (v
′; β, ε) i′ Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) ⇒ Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε) i′′ Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) .
Define C ′′ as follows: if Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′ Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) then Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) ∼i′ C ′′ ∼i′′
Ci′′j′ (v
′; β, ε), otherwise C ′′ = Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε). Analogously, define C ′ as follows: if Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) %i′
Ci′′j′ (v
′; β, ε) then Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε) ∼i′ C ′ ∼i′′ Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε), otherwise C ′ = Ci′j′ (v′; β, ε).
Then we also know that C ′ %SC W %SC C ′′. Ms i′ revealed C ′ i′ C ′′ by the premise
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Ci′j′ (v
′; β, ε) i′ Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε). Hence, by Jewitt’s order, Ms i′′ agrees, i.e., C ′ i′′ C ′′.
Moreover, since Ms i′ has an advantage when with Mr j′′, while Ms i′′ has an advantage
when with Mr j′, we obtain Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε) %i′′ C ′ i′′ C ′′ %i′′ Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε), and hence GDD
holds. Therefore, the economy satisfies NAM.
Proof of Lemma 3. We show that GID, a sufficient condition for PAM, holds. First, note
that C ∈ C− implies that W ∈ C−, i.e., that ε ≤ 0. Then, by Lemma 6 in Appendix B we
know that women’s relevant PC is (4). Second, from Lemma 2, we know that C %SC W and
Z − C %SC M . In this case, by Lemma 1, we know that Ms i′′ (Mr j′′) has an advantage
over Ms i′ (Mr j′).
Further, the PKCs (2) of Mr j′ and Mr j′′ satisfy the following single-crossing property.
Let C satisfy (2) for both Mr j′ and Mr j′′. Any contract C˜ which is less Jewitt-risky for
the man, i.e., Z − C˜ %SC Z − C, and which satisfies the PKC for Mr j′ must also satisfy
the PKC for Mr j′′. Conversely, any contract C ′′ which is more Jewitt-risky for the man, i.e.
Z − C ′′ -SC Z − C, and which satisfies the PKC for Mr j′′ must also satisfy the PKC for
Mr j′.
Suppose first that Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε) satisfies the PKC of Mr j′′. Then we have GID directly,
since Ms i′′ cannot do worse than Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε) when she faces the less stringent PC (5) of
Mr j′′.
Now, suppose instead that Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε) violates the PKC of Mr j′′. We first show that
Ci′j′′ (v
′′; β, ε) is less Jewitt-risky than Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε). Assume indirectly the opposite. By the
revealed preference of Ms i′ for Mr j′′, the contract Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) satisfies the PKC of Mr j′′
while either the PC (5) of Mr j′ or the PKC of Mr j′ must be binding or violated. The PKCs
of Mr j′ and Mr j′′ cross at most once on C−. Moreover, the PC (5) of Mr j′ and the PKC
of Mr j′′ also cross at most once on C−, since the former can be expressed as a pivoted PKC
of Mr j′ with an even steeper slope, which reinforces the single-crossing property present
among two PKCs. Therefore, any contract which is less Jewitt-risky than Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) and
which satisfies both the PC (5) and the PKC of Mr j′ also satisfies the PKC of Mr j′′. In
particular, this is the case for Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε). However, this contradicts our assumption that
Ci′′j′ (v
′; β, ε) violates the PKC of Mr j′′.
Now, assume that Ms i′′ could improve upon Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) by the more Jewitt-risky
contract Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε). Since Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) satisfies the PC of Ms i′, any increased spread
which is preferred by Ms i′′ must also be preferred by Ms i′. Moreover, the PC of Ms i′ cannot
be violated by an increased spread which does not reduce expected utility, hence Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε)
must also satisfy the PC (4) of Ms i′. But since Ms i′ revealed that such a contract cannot
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be better than Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε), we obtain Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′ Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε). Then, by Jewitt’s
order, we obtain Ci′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′′ Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε). Finally, since Ms i′′ has an advantage over
Ms i′, we obtain Ci′′j′′ (v′′; β, ε) %i′′ Ci′′j′ (v′; β, ε) and GID.
Proof of Proposition 3. If ε = −1, transfers cannot be larger than those which provide
risk-free consumption to the woman. Therefore, we know that Cij (v; β, ε) ∈ C− for all v and
for all 〈i, j〉. Then, using Lemma 3 we obtain PAM.
Proof of Proposition 4. In order to determine whether the PCs of spouses in a couple are
stringent enough to guarantee Cij (v; β, ε) ∈ C− for all v and for all 〈i, j〉, we consider both
the minimum sure consumption of a woman which satisfies her PC, and the maximum sure
consumption of a woman which satisfies her partner’s PC.
Definition 6. Consider ε < 0. Call ci(β, ε) (cj(β, ε)) the level of constant consumption by
Ms i which satisfies her PC, (4) (the PC of Mr j, (5)), as equality. In mathematical terms,
ci(β, ε) is implicitly given by
1
1− βu (i, ci(β, ε)) = u(i, 1− εy) +
β
1− βEu(i,W ),
and cj(β, ε) is defined by
u (j, z − cj(β, ε)) + β
1− βEu (j, Z − cj(β, ε)) = u(j, 1 + y) +
β
1− βEu(j,M).
Note that ci(β, ε) can be either above or below cj(β, ε). If ci(β, ε) > cj(β, ε), then the couple
〈i, j〉 cannot sustain transfers that are large enough to provide risk-free consumption to Ms i.
We can now restate our sufficient condition for PAM in Lemma 3 using ci(β, ε) and
cj(β, ε).
Lemma 4. For any −1 < ε < 0, ci(β, ε) ≥ cj(β, ε) if and only if Cij (v; β, ε) ∈ C− for all v.
Proof. First, note that any contract which assigns less consumption than ci(β, ε) in both
states violates the woman’s PC (4) and any contract which assigns more than cj(β, ε) in
both states violates the man’s PC (5). Second, note that ε < 0 means W ∈ C−. Now,
consider first the case where cj(β, ε) = ci(β, ε). Then we know that the crossing point of the
two PCs is exactly on the line C− ∩C+, and any contract in C+ \C− violates at least one
PC. Second, suppose that cj(β, ε) < ci(β, ε). Then the woman cannot even get to constant
consumption, because the PC of the man crosses the line C−∩C+ below her own PC, which
implies Cij (v; β, ε) ∈ C−.
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To show the converse, first note that for any −1 < ε < 0, Cij (v; β, ε) ∈ C− for all v
implies for that the couple 〈i, j〉 cannot sustain efficient transfers for any v. Consider first
the case where the couple cannot sustain positive transfers. The man’s PC is always violated
at any C ∈ C−∩C+ for which the PC of the woman is satisfied. Therefore, cj(β, ε) ≤ ci(β, ε).
Second, assume that the couple can sustain positive transfers. Then there exists a promise
vLR such that both the man’s PC and the woman’s PC hold as equality. Further, the
contract Cij(vLR; β, ε) corresponds to the intersection of the two PCs. However, since we
have Cij(v; β, ε) ∈ C− for all v by assumption, we know that Cij(vLR; β, ε) ∈ C−. Therefore,
since the two PCs intersect in C−, we obtain cj(β, ε) ≤ ci(β, ε).
Next we prove comparative statics results for ci(β, ε) and cj(β, ε) as β, risk aversion, and
ε change.20
Lemma 5. Assume ε < 0.
• ci(β, ε) is decreasing in β for all i,
• ci′(β, ε) ≥ ci′′(β, ε) for all β, and
• ci(β, ε) is increasing (decreasing) in ε if ε ≤ εi(β) (if ε ≥ εi(β)), where εi(β) is implicitly
defined by x(i, 1 + εi(β)y) = (1− βPr (s))/βPr (s).
Similarly,
• cj(β, ε) is increasing in β for all j,
• cj′′(β, ε) ≥ cj′(β, ε) for all β, and
• cj(β, ε) is increasing (decreasing) in ε if ε ≤ εj(β) (if ε ≥ εj(β)), where εj(β) is implicitly
defined by x(j, Z − cj (β, εj(β))) = βPr (s) /(1− βPr (s)).
Proof. Multiplying the PC (4) by (1 − β), the level ci(β, ε) is defined by u(i, ci′′(β, ε)) =
αu(i, w) + (1 − α)u(i, w) where α = β Pr(s). Under the assumption ε < 0, we have w ≥ w,
and the right-hand side of the equality decreases with β, hence the monotonicity of ci in the
first argument.
Moreover, applying Jewitt’s order, we get u(i′′, ci′(β, ε)) ≥ αu(i′′, w) + (1 − α)u(i′′, w),
since (ci′(β, ε), ci′(β, ε)) %SC W . This inequality implies that the PC (4) of Ms i′′ is satisfied
at (ci′(β, ε), ci′(β, ε), and we have ci′′(β, ε) ≤ ci′(β, ε).
To prove the hump-shaped relationship between ci(β, ε) and ε, note first that the right-
hand side of the woman’s relevant PC, (4), u(i, 1 − εy) + β
1−βEu(i,W ), is strictly concave
20Note that while ε does not affect the man’s continuation value in autarky, it determines the size of
aggregate risk (1+ε)Y , which has to be borne in its entirety by the man, given that the woman’s consumption
is constant.
33
in ε due to the strict concavity of u in consumption. Maximising it with respect to ε, the
first-order condition is
−
(
1 +
β
1− βPr (s)
)
∂
∂c
u(i, 1− εy)y +
(
Pr (s)
β
1− β
)
∂
∂c
u (i, 1 + εy) y = 0.
Due to the Inada conditions and concavity, the first-order condition is necessary and sufficient
for a maximum. Rearranging, the maximiser is characterised by uc(i,1+εi(β)y)
uc(i,1−εi(β)y) =
1−βPr(s)
βPr(s)
. Since
ci(β, ε) increases with the continuation value of autarky, the result follows.
Now, proceeding analogously for men, we obtain cj(β, ε) by multiplying (5) by (1 − β),
where (1 − α′)u(j, z − cj(β, ε)) + α′u(j, z − cj(β, ε)) = (1 − α′)u(j,m) + α′u(j,m) and α′ =
β Pr(s). The monotonicity with respect to β obtains since both z ≥ z and w ≥ w while α′
increases in β.
Moreover, since W ∈ C− and (ci′(β, ε), ci′(β, ε)) is a reduced spread of W , Lemma 2 says
that Z − cj′(β, ε) SC M . Applying Jewitt’s order to the PC (5) of Mr j′ and Mr j′′, we
obtain cj′′(β, ε) ≥ cj′(β, ε) for all β.
Finally, we prove the hump-shaped relationship between cj(β, ε) and ε. First, we show
that εj(β) maximises cj(β, ε). To do so, we need to show that cj (β, εj(β)) violates the PC
(5) for all ε 6= εj(β). If the woman has a risk-free level of consumption k, then the left-hand
side of (5) can be expressed by the function
v˜ (k, ε) =
[
1 +
β
1− βPr (s)
]
u (j, 2 + (1 + ε)y − k)+ β
1− β [1− Pr (s)]u (j, 2− (1 + ε)y − k) .
By definition (5) holds as equality at k = cj(β, ε) for all ε, hence v˜ (cj (β, ε) , ε) = v˜ (cj (β, ε′) , ε′)
for any ε and ε′. Moreover, if v˜ (cj (β, ε) , ε′) ≥ v˜ (cj (β, ε) , ε), then cj(β, ε′) ≥ cj(β, ε).
Since u is strictly concave in consumption, v˜() is strictly concave in its second argument, ε.
Setting the partial derivative of v˜() with respect to the second argument equal to 0 eval-
uated at k = cj (β, εj(β)) yields the condition
uc[j,2+(1+εj(β))y−cj(β,εj(β))]
uc[j,2−(1+εj(β))y−cj(β,εj(β))] =
βPr(s)
1−βPr(s) , which
is equivalent to x(j, Z − cj (β, εj(β))) = βPr (s) /(1 − βPr (s)). Therefore, εj(β) satisfies
v˜ (cj (β, εj(β)) , ε) < v˜ (cj (β, εj(β)) , εj(β)) = v˜ (cj (β, ε) , ε) for all ε 6= εj(β). As a re-
sult, cj (β, εj(β)) violates the PC (5) for all ε 6= εj(β), hence cj (β, εj(β)) > cj(β, ε) for
all ε 6= εj(β), as we wanted to show.
Now, given that v˜() is strictly concave in ε, we know that v˜ (k, ε) in increasing (decreasing)
with ε whenever ε ≤ εj(β) (ε ≥ εj(β)). This implies that cj(β, ε) has to increase (decrease)
with ε for ε ≤ εj(β) (ε ≥ εj(β)) to keep v˜ (cj(β, ε), ε) constant, which proves the result.
Intuitively, given ε < 0, as agents become more patient, they find it less difficult to commit
to large transfers. In turn, ci(β, ε) decreases as the woman’s PC is less stringent, and cj(β, ε)
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increases as the man’s PC is less stringent. Moreover, given that risk-free consumption by
the woman cannot be more Jewitt-risky than her income, ci′(β, ε) satisfies the PC (4) of
Ms i′′. As men’s consumption is always less Jewitt-risky than their income if ε < 0, cj′(β, ε)
satisfies the PC (5) of Mr j′′ as well. That is, these consumption levels capture advantage.
Further, the woman’s PC becomes more stringent if her outside option improves. That is, if
an increase in ε reduces (increases) the continuation value of autarky, then ci(β, ε) increases
(decreases). We show that autarky utility is first increasing, then decreasing in ε. Finally,
cj(β, ε) is also first increasing, then decreasing in ε. To see why, note that the man bears all
aggregate risk when the woman’s consumption is constant. An increase in ε from −1 may
therefore first increase cj(β, ε) if the low aggregate income state, s, occurs with low enough
probability. However, as ε increases beyond a critical level, the negative effect of bearing a
greater risk dominates and cj(β, ε) declines.
Now we can complete our proof. Lemma 5 says that ci(β, ε) decreases while cj(β, ε)
increases in β for any couple 〈i, j〉, including importantly 〈I, J〉. In addition, the two functions
cI(β, ε) and cJ(β, ε) are continuous in β by our continuity assumptions on u. Since cI(0, ε) <
cJ(0, ε) and cI(1, ε) > cJ(1, ε) for any ε < 0, there exists a β(ε) ∈ (0, 1) such that cI(β(ε), ε) =
cJ(β(ε), ε) and cI(β, ε) ≥ cJ(β, ε) if β < β(ε). Moreover, Lemma 5 implies that ci(β, ε) ≥
cj(β, ε), for any i ∈ I and any j ∈ J , whenever cI(β, ε) ≥ cJ(β, ε). Then, Lemma 4
guarantees Cij (v; β, ε) ∈ C− for all β ≤ β(ε), and Lemma 3 yields the result that the
economy satisfies PAM.
Proof of Proposition 5. By Lemmas 3 and 4, we obtain PAM whenever ci (β, ε) ≥ cj (β, ε)
for all 〈i, j〉. What remains to be shown is that the latter condition holds whenever (i) or (ii)
is satisfied.
(i) Under the assumption εJ(β) ≤ εI(β), by Lemma 5, cI(β, ε) is increasing and cJ(β, ε) is
decreasing in ε for all ε ∈ [ε0, εI(β)]. This implies that cI(β, ε) ≥ cJ(β, ε) holds for all
such ε.
(ii) Similarly, under the assumption εI(β) ≤ εJ(β), by Lemma 5, we know that cI(β, ε) is
increasing and cJ(β, ε) is decreasing in ε for all ε ∈ [εI(β), ε0]. Therefore, cI(β, ε) ≥
cJ(β, ε) holds for all such ε.
Finally, using Lemma 5 again, we know that ci(β, ε) ≥ cj(β, ε) holds for all couples 〈i, j〉
whenever cI(β, ε) ≥ cJ(β, ε).
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B The relevant PCs
Lemma 6. There exists a threshold ε˜ij(β) such that ∀ε ≤ ε˜ij(β) the woman’s relevant PC is
(4). Further, ε˜ij(β) > 0, and if the woman is less risk averse than the man, then ε˜ij(β) = 1.
Proof. First, for ε ≤ 0 the correlation between the incomes of spouses is non-positive, and
each spouse makes a positive net transfer in his/her high-income state. In particular, the
woman makes a transfer in state s, and hence her relevant PC is (4). Second, for ε = 1 there
is only aggregate risk, which can only be shared by spouses with different risk aversions.
Further, the less risk-averse spouse shall bear more consumption risk. This implies that if
the man is less risk averse than the woman, he makes a positive net transfer in state s and
the woman’s relevant PC is no longer (4).
What remains to be shown is that the two autarky ratios of marginal utilities, x (j,M)
and x (j,W ) are equal for at most one value of ε. The man’s autarky ratio of marginal
utilities, x (j,M), is not changing with ε. The woman’s is
x (i,W ) =
uc(i, w)
uc(i, w)
=
uc(i, 1 + εy)
uc(i, 1− εy) ,
which is decreasing with ε, and the result follows.
In addition, we have the following comparative statics results for the threshold ε˜ij(β).
Lemma 7. (i) Take the man’s preferences as given. The threshold ε˜·j(β) decreases with the
woman’s risk aversion.
(ii) Take the woman’s preferences as given. The threshold ε˜i·(β) increases with the man’s
risk aversion.
Proof. (i) Let ε˜i′j(β) denote the threshold for Ms i′, which is characterised by x(i′,W ) =
x(j,M). Now consider a more risk-averse woman, Ms i′′, with u(i′′, ·) = φ (u(i′, ·)) and φ()
increasing and strictly concave. By Lemma 6, we have ε˜ij(β) > 0, ∀〈i, j〉. Then, since φ′() is
decreasing, we obtain
x(i′,W ) =
uc(i
′, 1 + ε˜i′j(β)y)
uc(i′, 1− ε˜i′j(β)y) >
φ′ (u(i′, 1 + ε˜i′j(β)y))uc(i′, 1 + ε˜i′j(β)y)
φ′ (u(i′, 1− ε˜i′j(β)y))uc(i′, 1− ε˜i′j(β)y) = x(i
′′,W ).
Suppose first that ε˜i′j = 1. The result obtains trivially, since ε˜i′′j cannot exceed 1 by as-
sumption. In the alternative case, i.e., when ε˜i′j < 1, the above condition implies x(i′′,W ) <
x(j,M). Therefore, the relevant PC for Ms i′′ cannot be (4), which proves ε˜i′′j < ε˜i′j.
(ii) Applying an analogous argument to x(j′,M) and x(j′′,M), where Mr j′′ is more risk
averse than Mr j′, as before, completes the proof.
36
Lemma 7 first implies that as ε increases the first couple for which the woman’s relevant
PC may no longer be (4) is the couple 〈i′′, j′〉. Second, the last couple to switch, which may
occur if both women are more risk averse than both men, is the couple 〈i′, j′′〉. Finally, the
second couple to switch may be either 〈i′, j′〉, i.e., ε˜i′j′ < ε˜i′′j′′ , or 〈i′′, j′′〉, i.e., ε˜i′′,j′′ < ε˜i′j′ .
C Algorithm to find stable matchings and determine their
assortativity with dynamic contacts
We assume for simplicity that any couple who shares risk efficiently does so for a unique
relative Pareto weight in the long run. The extension to the case where some couples share
risk efficiently for an interval of weights is immediate. To fix ideas, we assume that the
woman makes a positive net transfer in state s for all couples. It is straightforward to
consider alternatives.
Let αpi = (pi − piβ)/(1− piβ) and α1−pi = [(1− pi)− (1− pi)β]/[1− (1− pi)β]. Further, let
c(i, j) (c(i, j)) denote the long-run consumption of Ms i in state s (s), which is independent
of v, and let ULRi (s, j) = (1 − β)u (i, c(i, j)) + β [(1− pi)u (i, c(i, j)) + piu (i, c(i, j))] denote
the expected long-run per-period utility for Ms i sharing risk with Mr j given that the first
constraint to bind is the one in state s, and similarly for the other state and for Mr j.
Step 0. Specify endowment processes, utility functions, and β.
Step 1. Compute the long-run allocation for each potential couple. This involves solving a
system of two equations (the two relevant PCs) with two unknowns, consumption by Ms i
in state s and in state s.
Step 2. Choose v′, making sure that at least one feasible contract can provide this utility
to Mr j′ when he share risk with Ms i′.
Step 3. Compute cˆ(i, j′, v′), i ∈ {i′, i′′}: use
αpiu (j, z − cˆ(i, j′, v′)) + (1− αpi)ULRj′ (s, i) = v′,
where we have computed the infinite sum and simplified to get this expression for the expected
per-period utility of Mr J , and verify that cˆ(i, j′, v′) > c(i, j′, v′); or use
α1−piu (j, z − cˆ(i, j′, v′)) + (1− αpi)ULRj′ (s, i) = v′
and verify that cˆ(i, j′, v′) < c(i, j′, v′). Note that only one or neither of the two conditions
will hold for a given v′. (If neither holds, then there is no transition.)
Step 4. Compute the per-period utility for Ms i′′ sharing risk with Mr j′: if cˆ(i′′, j′, v′) >
c(i′′, j′), then
Eu(i′′, j′, v′) = αpiu (i′′, cˆ(i′′, j′, v′)) + (1− αpi)ULRi′′ (s, j′) ;
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and if cˆ(i′′, j′, v′) < c(i′′, j′), then
Eu(i′′, j′, v′) = α1−piu (i′′, cˆ(i′′, j′, v′)) + (1− α1−pi)ULRi′′ (s, j′) .
Step 5. Compute v′′ such that Ms i′ is indifferent between the two potential partners: if
cˆ(i′, j′, v′) > c(i′, j′), then v′′ is implicitly given by
αpiu (i
′, cˆ(i′, j′, v′)) + (1− αpi)ULRi′ (s, j′) = αpiu (i′, cˆ(i′, j′′, v′′)) + (1− αpi)ULRi′ (s, j′′) ,
and verify that cˆ(i′, j′′, v′′) > c(i′, j′′); and if cˆ(i′, j′, v′) < c(i′, j′), then v′′ is implicitly given
by
α1−piu (i′, cˆ(i′, j′, v′)) + (1− α1−pi)ULRi′ (s, j′) = αpiu (i′, cˆ(i′, j′′, v′′)) + (1− αpi)ULRi′ (s, j′′) ,
and verify that cˆ(i′, j′′, v′′) < c(i′, j′′, v′′).
Step 6. Compute cˆ(i′′, j′′, v′′): use
αpiu (j, z − cˆ(i′′, j′′, v′′)) + (1− αpi)ULRj′′ (s, i′′) = v′′,
and verify that cˆ(i′′, j′′, v′′) > c(i′′, j′′); or use
α1−piu (j, z − cˆ(i′′, j′′, v′′)) + (1− αpi)ULRj′′ (s, i′′) = v′′,
and verify that cˆ(i′′, j′′, v′′) < c(i′′, j′′). Note that only one or neither of the two conditions
will hold for a given v′′.
Step 7. Compute the per-period utility for Ms i′′ sharing risk with Mr j′′: if cˆ(i′′, j′′, v′′) >
c(i′′, j′′), then
Eu(i′′, j′′, v′′) = αpiu (i′′, cˆ(i′′, j′′, v′′)) + (1− αpi)ULRi′′ (s, j′′) ;
and if cˆ(i′′, j′′, v′′) < c(i′′, j′′), then
Eu(i′′, j′′, v′′) = α1−piu (i′′, cˆ(i′′, j′′, v′′)) + (1− α1−pi)ULRi′′ (s, j′′) .
Step 8. Compare Eu(i′′, j′′, v′′) and Eu(i′′, j′, v′). If Eu(i′′, j′′, v′′) ≥ Eu(i′′, j′, v′), then we
have found a stable matching which is positive assortative. If Eu(i′′, j′′, v′′) ≤ Eu(i′′, j′, v′),
then we have found a stable matching which is negative assortative.
38
